Portugal em Fanicos !

Grafismo de Luís Vargas 

Portugal 2015: o desemprego real

Via: 365 forte

Atenas, Julho de 2015

Protesters march in front of the Greek parliament holding banners and flags. Around 50 anti-austerity demonstrators were arrested by police.

 

A youth in an oxygen mask hurls a petrol bomb as violence breaks out in the Greek capital on the eve of the parliament debate on the bailout.

Dozens of hooded anti-austerity demonstrators and riot police clashed on the streets of Athens last night, with petrol bombs being thrown.

Protest: Greeks took to the streets of Athens on Monday furious at the way Tsipras handled negotiations - rejecting lighter reforms during months of talks before caving in to harsh austerity measures at the 11th hour.

Hostility: Greeks have accused Germany of using WW2-style tactics to condemn their country to austerity. Pictured is a poster outside an Athens bank depicting German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble as a Nazi.

A woman burns a Syriza flag during a demonstration against the Greek bailout deal in Athens on Tuesday. Many people in the country have been angered by the agreement.

 

Fonte: Daily Mail

O IV REICH

Todos e qualquer um dos envolvidos na chamada “maratona negocial” de Bruxelas – se é que aquilo teve alguma coisa de negocial – podem reclamar o seu pedacinho de “acordo”, até a paternidade do êxito, como faz o primeiro ministro de Portugal em exercício, mas o mais fácil de tudo é identificar as vítimas: os gregos e, com eles, todos os povos da Europa.

Em bicos de pés, à deriva como sempre, Hollande ufana-se de ter driblado a estratégia alemã de expulsar a Grécia do Euro; Tsipras, que vai ter de explicar a quase dois terços dos gregos que disseram não à troika e à austeridade porque é que eles vão continuar a receber visitas da troika para os esmagar com a austeridade, argumenta que foram derrotados os intentos das forças mais conservadoras da Europa; Tusk, Juncker, Djesselbloem e companhia dirão o que muito bem lhes apetecer por tudo lhes ser permitido.

A senhora Merkel, porém, limita-se a dizer que a Grécia “ainda tem um longo caminho a percorrer” para que o acordo se transforme em nova ajuda envenenada que garantirá mais recessão em cima dos 25% já acumulados – o diagnóstico é feito pelo insuspeito canal Bloomberg.

O senhor Schauble, esse conserva o sábio silêncio dos vencedores. Os mercados respiram aliviados, as bolsas navegam em euforia, os credores afinam as contas à luz das novas operações especulativas que aí vêm. O senhor Schauble pode gozar o triunfo em silêncio, os factos falam por ele, o IV Reich venceu um duro teste e, por isso, sai dele mais reforçado.

A Alemanha pretendia a saída da Grécia da Zona Euro e não o conseguiu? É meia verdade. A saída seria a situação limite no caso de o governo grego manter as exigências que começou por apresentar; Berlim, porém, não desejava a saída pela saída. Esta funcionaria como um castigo exemplar para um caso de persistente rebeldia, mas tornar-se-ia desnecessária se essa atitude se desvanecesse através dos processos de chantagem a que as instituições e dirigentes europeus chamam “negociação”.

Como o governo grego cedeu, e permite até que o processo de privatização do país seja, um quarto de século depois, uma réplica da liquidação da RDA, pode evitar-se a saída do país do Euro e as concomitantes perturbações nos mercados. O exemplo para os eventuais recalcitrantes ficou dado, a par da demonstração de que não há alternativa à austeridade e à liquidação sistemática dos direitos sociais, laborais e humanos. Perfeito.

Reina agora a paz no IV Reich. A experiência de um governo fora do arco da governação, como a que foi tentada na Grécia, está em frangalhos meio ano depois; a troika continua viva e de boa saúde para que os credores recebam tudo a que têm e não têm direito; as dívidas soberanas, impossíveis de pagar, poderão ultrapassar em breve os 200% dos PIB – o que não será difícil com a acelerada degradação destes – pelo que os especuladores exultam. A senhora Merkel necessitou de apenas meia dúzia de horas para reencontrar a moeda de “confiança” que alegou ter perdido antes da reunião fatal para os gregos. E para que o fundo de garantia da “ajuda” à Grécia construído a partir das privatizações do que ainda resta no país não descarrile, por detrás da ideia e da execução estão instituições financeiras alemãs tituladas por gente idónea como o senhor Schauble e o senhor Sigmar Gabriel, o chefe dos sociais- democratas, aliás os inventores da engenhosa estratégia de privatização da RDA.

Alguns ingénuos poderão interrogar-se: mas por onde andam a democracia, a vontade dos povos, no meio disto tudo? A resposta é simples: o IV Reich, como os anteriores, não se orienta pelos ideais democráticos mas sim pelo respeito dos genuínos interesses alemães, na Alemanha e em toda a parte.

Assim nasceram duas guerras mundiais, sem que tenha desaparecido a arrogância germânica, enquanto vai crescendo a sede de vingança. Realidade que se percebe na ânsia não apenas de derrotar os mais fracos, mas também de os humilhar.

 

Texto de José Goulão, via Mundo Cão

'We underestimated their power': Greek government insider lifts the lid on five months of 'humiliation' and 'blackmail'

In this interview with Mediapart, a senior advisor to the Greek government, who has been at the heart of the past five months of negotiations between Athens and its international creditors, reveals the details of what resembles a game of liar’s dice over the fate of a nation that has been brought to its economic and social knees. His account gives a rare and disturbing insight into the process which has led up to this week’s make-or-break deadline for reaching a bailout deal between Greece and international lenders, without which the country faces crashing out of the euro and complete bankruptcy. He describes the extraordinary bullying of Greece’s radical-left government by the creditors, including Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem’s direct threat to cause the collapse of the Hellenic banks if it failed to sign-up to a drastic austerity programme. “We went into a war thinking we had the same weapons as them”, he says. “We underestimated their power”.

 

A senior member of Greece’s negotiating team with its European creditors agreed to a meeting last week in Athens with Mediapart special correspondent Christian Salmon. Speaking on condition that his name is withheld, he detailed the history of the protracted and bitter negotiations between the radical-left Syriza government, elected in January, and international lenders for the provision of a new bailout for the debt-ridden country.

The almost two-hour interview in English took place just days before last Sunday’s referendum on the latest drastic austerity-driven bailout terms offered by the creditors, and opposed by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, and which were finally rejected by 61.3% of Greek voters.

 

While the ministerial advisor slams the stance of the international creditors, who he accuses of leading a strategy of deliberate suffocation of Greece’s finances and economy, he is also critical of some of the decisions taken by Athens. His account also throws light on the personal tensions surrounding the talks led by former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, who resigned from his post on Monday deploring “a certain preference by some Eurogroup participants, and assorted ‘partners’, for my ‘absence’ from its meetings”.

The advisor cites threats proffered to Varoufakis by Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem, warning he would sink Greece's banks unless the Tsipras government bowed to the harsh deal on offer, and by German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who he says demanded: "How much money do you want to leave the euro?"

 

The interview follows below and over the following three pages presented in a continuous series of extracts (editor’s notes appear in italics within hard brackets):

-------------------------

 

From early on I disagreed that it was only a negotiation - we give this, you give that, you come closer. Because what happened was they had some negotiations, some details about fiscal policy, about conditions, et cetera. So, through these discussions it was the government that was coming, coming - coming close to the Troika, without them making any move towards us, and never discussing the debt: debt restructuring, debt sustainability, and also, you know, financing. We are going to get some new financing, is the ECB [editor's note: European Central Bank] going to lift all these caps, all these restrictions, these limits on how much the banks can borrow, the state can borrow from the banks? Because we can't borrow.

We used to. Up until February, we could still issue treasury bills. Short-term, three-month fixed bonds, mostly one-year. But this government was never allowed to do that because it was finished. No more treasury bills […] You see, the problem with treasury bills, [is that] it is the Greek banks who buy it. And the ECB said: “No more treasury bills”. So the state could not borrow from the banks.

So, from March, April onwards, we started economizing from the state, pulling together all the cash reserves from different branches, agencies, local authorities, things like that, in order to manage to pay the IMF [International Monetary Fund]. We paid once, we paid twice, and [we had] to pay wages as well. We paid wages from earnings, from tax receipts. But it's not enough to pay the IMF. We have a problem with the primary surplus, we couldn't pay the IMF, so we had to scrape around.

 

So basically this has created a domestic shortage of liquidity, liquidity in cash. Banks, export companies, good companies, could not borrow, people could not pay back their debts, they couldn't get any extensions to their credits and basically the credit system started to disintegrate, to not function. Of course, the banks themselves had some security reserves, but when they reached the point they said the banks can't even borrow even from the ELA [Emergency Liquidity Assistance fund] at all, they had to shut down, because they would deplete their reserves.

[...] Companies who do not pay their employees through bank accounts cannot pay cash to the employees - and there are many. Also they say "look, we don't have any revenues so I give you 500 euros instead of 800 euros and we'll see what happens after the banks reopen". So we have a situation which is escalating into a chain reaction […] like having a heart attack. A heart attack if you view cash liquidity as the blood of the economy. On the weekend when the ECB stopped, we had the heart attack. Now we are having its after effects. Different organs are getting numb. Some stop working, others are trying but they don't have enough blood.

 

On former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis:

 

Unable to see eye-to-eye: Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem (left) and Yanis Varoufakis meeting in Athens in February. © Reuters.

 

People are asking why he is supposed to be so unpopular with the Eurogroup and the people in power, why they don't like him. And a lot of people say they don't like him because he appears to be lecturing them, because of being arrogant. He thinks this is an academic issue, an economic issue or a technical issue. But what I think is that all these people - especially people in politics, in power, the Eurogroup, fellow ministers - they have seen a phenomenon that is much more different than anything they have encountered in their circle, from those elected, in the normal process of politics.

Because you have a man that has his own style of dressing, he is very self-confident, at the same time he is very friendly, very open, very honest. You know, you ask him a question and he doesn't spin around, he doesn't change the subject, and so this creates difficulty, both to the politician and the journalist, [to] the media. These are two things that show that Varoufakis doesn't fit, but on the other hand he is a celebrity and he creates clashing emotions. You hate him or you love him.

 

On the grave immediate crisis facing the Greek banks:

The reserves were not to the amount. We are in a situation where normally the liquidity in the market, the money that circulates in the market, is around 10 billion euros, but now with all that is happening, [with] people keeping money under the mattress, it is around 50 billion. 50 billion euros of cash circulate, and the ECB has stopped [its emergency funding of Greek banks]. So this means that people who have bank accounts, say [with] 2-3-4-5 thousand [euros], they can only get 60 euros per day, and if you have more accounts, OK, you can get more per day. But what about the people who have no account, who expect to live off their salary? At the end of every month they are broke until the paycheck comes […] From yesterday they were only giving 50 euros. Only smaller banks, like post office banks, which have fewer customers, can still give 60 euros. But the big four [banks] - National, Piraeus, Alpha and Eurobank - have run out of [notes of] 20s, so they can only give 50. So from 60 euros it has fallen to 50.

 

A  security guard delivers cash to a bank in Athens, June 28th. © Reuters.

 

But the security reserves which they have kept, they run out of it. If all the people go and get 60 euros - even if they don't need it, but just to save something - there will come a time they [the banks] will have no cash [left]. And that's where the problem starts. And in that case, if we don't have an emergency liquidity supply from the ECB, we have no option but to start issuing some kind of [parallel] money. Of course, that would be the end of the economy because already there is fear, there is panic, that even if the banks open again, they will still need to be re-capitalised. Up to now, they have been solvent.

They were borrowing from the ELA, they should have been able to borrow from the ECB as well, but the ECB said "No, from now on we don't accept your collateral. You have to borrow more expensively from the ELA". That's another of those caps limits the banks have. But if they run out of reserves, the state paid about 40 billion to replenish the capital which the banks lost after the [2012] haircut of the old Greek bonds.

The part of the second programme of the agreement of 2012, after the haircut of the PSI [Private Sector Involvement], which was about 170 billion euros, 50 billion out of that was for the recapitalisation of the banks. Of course, there was another problem. From the PSI, the public funds suffered losses almost, if not more, in their own reserves. Why? Because they were forced under the law to save their cash reserves with the Bank of Greece, and the Bank of Greece had the right to use these funds to buy bonds on their behalf.

For me it was a big scandal because apparently what happened was a lot of politicians, bankers, a lot of people went and gave - they had bonds that they had bought 20% - they went and they gave it to the Greek Central Bank, Bank of Greece, 100%, they got their money and then the haircut comes to the public.

 

Basically, what they were forced to do was to use their cash reserves, social security funds, pension funds, in order to buy government bonds that were going to be cut in real terms around 70% in present value. So the funds right now, the pension funds, are facing a bigger problem than the banks are facing. The pension funds have to plan 15 to 20 years ahead to be able to pay pensions, when the aging population is increasing and the working population is decreasing. They also have to pay unemployment benefits and so on. So, all these debt locks came to the front now.

[…] Already from the end of February and certainly by the middle of March it was obvious that the creditors were not going to honour the February 20th agreement, which says that Greece proposes reforms, the Troika - "the Institutions", as it is now called - evaluates and agrees and the reforms go on. Nothing like that happened. The institutions were continuously rejecting reforms without looking. "No, they are too generous" and Varoufakis was telling them: "Please, let us complete four to five reforms on which we all agree and view as necessary and let us implement them and you can evaluate and make an assessment of them".

[The Institutions said] "No, no, we need a comprehensive agreement before we implement these reforms, because if you implement these reforms that would be a unilateral action. We haven't approved them yet, ok, we agree, but we still haven't determined the primary surplus". So we are unable to do anything while at the same time they wanted to see our books because they didn't trust our numbers. "We want to go to the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Greece" et cetera, and Varoufakis was saying: "No, let’s start from the agreement of February 20th under which you are not supervising the Greek economy anymore and you are not assisting us or the creditors to assess the viability of the economy so as to gradually return to growth. That's the objective of the February 20th agreement, an extension of the existing programme. We amend, evaluate and complete the programme in four months. June 30th, programme finished".  

But they pulled the plug on the banks and on Tuesday June 30th the programme finished, so we are not in a programme.

All the money they owe us… about 17 billion euros, [of which] 10 billion [is] from the remainder of the 50-billion-euro [Hellenic] Financial Stability Fund which, under the February 20th agreement, we would have to give back. We have not received any money from June last year, so for 12 months we have been paying around 10 billion euros to the creditors from our resources without getting a single euro from them, which they had agreed to give, of course under conditions. It was obvious they were not going to cooperate and that we needed growth and these were two problems going side by side. They didn't want to finance the money we were entitled to in order to pay the debts.

On the 'maze of pseudo-negotiations', and the 'character assassination' of Varoufakis:

All the loans we have received, 240 to 250 billion euros, go for the servicing of the debt, back to the creditors. The first bailout was a bailout of the banks to the state. We didn't get any finance in order to pay them, we couldn't borrow short-term and we couldn't facilitate the liquidity of the economy because the ECB was putting one restriction after the other. So you have the liquidity problem and at the same time you have a financing problem. The two of them are connected in what I called from the beginning ‘credit asphyxiation’.

In the middle of March, finally, some Brussels sources said to the correspondents in Brussels that "yes, the institutions – the EBD, IMF, European Commission, are using credit asphyxiation in order to force the government to comply, accept the reforms, do it quickly, et cetera.". For me it was an admission that they were using the worst king of economic blackmail to the country. The worst kind of economic sanctions. If we [take] Iraq, and instead of doing a trade embargo they said "we cut all your assets, your banks have no money, no dollars, no anything, you have to rely on printing money, you're going to have an exposure". But they didn't do that in Iraq. It was a trade embargo, not a financial or credit asphyxiation. Because at any moment, gradually, there comes a time you die. You can't survive this much longer. Varoufakis has even called it "waterboarding", financial and fiscal waterboarding.

The assumption is that by pulling the plug, they pull the plug of the whole world. This has not happened and I am sorry. I was following how the euro was going, how it was reacting, because they did experiments. [German finance minister Wolfgang] Schäuble and Berlin are clever, they enforce artificial crises into the negotiations now and then: "Oh, the Greeks are not cooperating, they haven't understood what to do, they are not giving any figures". And instead of falling, the euro is going up. The same with European stock exchanges.

[…] Only in the last week they [the Greek government] realised it, and Varoufakis made a couple of statements, that we go to the European Court of Justice. When you reach the explosion of the crisis, legal arguments are not valid anymore, they can't help.

I said let Tsipras go to the European Parliament and say that this is how we were treated the last months. Also, refuse to implement these harsh measures. They [the Greek government] prefer to lose the elections [rather than] to enforce those measures. But every time they try political negotiation they [have been] fooled by them [the creditors]: twenty times with Merkel and five more with Schäuble. And how many Eurogroup [meetings] where they said "go back to the technical teams, go back to the Troika". The [Greek government] said "no, we want a political decision" [but they were told] "Our political decision is to go back to the technical decision, you can't have a political decision without a technical decision".

 

 

A Syriza party poster during the July 5th referendum campaign urging a "No" vote "for democracy and dignity". © Amélie Poinssot

 

[…] At every point they were trying to undermine the prestige that the Greek [Syriza] government had won during the first months of negotiation. At the time people said "a new hope for Europe... a new hope for Germany, Spain... the Greeks are giving us the lead”. If [the Institutions] said from the beginning "It’s finished, we don't agree, no more negotiations" - which they said indirectly, for example [Dutch finance minister and Eurogroup president Jeroen] Dijsselbloem - then it'd be clear and we would be in a clash: "We are elected, have prestige and authority. You are wrong etc". But they didn't do that […] They created a maze of pseudo-negotiations, time wasted, and it was on their side. All the time they were carrying negative propaganda against Varoufakis. Character assassination, and Varoufakis keeps saying that. But what did he expect?

So here we are, having lost all the economic ground of negotiating in real terms, of finding a new agreement, and also lost the credibility to force them to negotiate with us. The government, Tsipras, says that when they presented us the ultimatum "take it or leave it" [it was] with worst measures than they had presented to the previous government, the right-wing government […] the ECB tells the parliament "You take the measures or on Monday you have no banks". But our banks were alright. So instead what [the Greek government] did, and it was correct as a move, they went for the referendum, which means that they would have to do what they did in Cyprus for a week. They believed the situation would bring them closer to a deal. They didn't want a crisis.

But they don't have enough of a global or a European crisis, or a collapse. Yes the stock exchanges fall, yes there are fluctuations, the pound is rising. But, in the end, the Europeans are not forced to come closer.

[…] Varoufakis and Tsipras say that in case of a "No" [vote in the July 5th referendum], our bargaining position is strengthened. That's why they say "No", and not to an agreement that is not on the table anymore. "No" to any kind of agreement that doesn't deal with the debt restructuring or fiscal adjustment. The amount that is left for [the European institutions) to pay, 17 billion euros - plus another 16 or 20 billion from the IMF - are lost. The programme is finished and you need a new agreement. Basically what you do is beg the Europeans for an emergency funding through the ECB. But they say that to do that they have to go back to parliaments et cetera. But you need recapitalization in order to re-enter a process of economic functioning that would allow for dealing with a new programme.

 

Behind the scenes with 'king' Schäuble, and when Dijsselbloem threatened to sink the Greek banks:

Of course, even to discuss Grexit is illegal since there is no legal provision in the Treaties to do that. […] There is no safeguard that a Grexit can happen in an orderly, negotiated, peaceful manner instead of disorderly, with people running to the foodstores. If you don't have a process of exit from the euro, then exit is a weapon of mass destruction. If you threaten someone with Grexit, you push him to the limit of the banking system's ability to withstand pressure. Then you destroy the banking system quickly and then you start from scratch to create new currency, which takes months to form.

Instead of saying that Grexit is illegal, they [the creditors] say that it's as destructive and disastrous for us as it is for you. That was wrong. First, I don't agree with this position because it's blackmail - "Be careful, I'm going to blow my brains out" - and it allows others to accuse us of blackmail. It's ridiculous for the others to accuse a country destroyed over five years of blackmail. But anyway, it's the wrong argument. The correct argument is that a Grexit and all the other measures that the Greeks have suffered are illegal under international law, under labour law, under the European treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights, European declaration of labour rights [contained in the European Social Charter].

 

The funny thing is that in early 2014, the European Parliament and all of them started attacking the Troika, with statements that it is illegal, unaccountable, is following measures that are destroying human rights, labour rights. Of course, we had a [conservative] government that didn't want to hear about this, because it wanted to attack the opposition and not the creditors. It failed to see that this was the greatest weapon we had.

For the weak side, there are only two methods. One is the law – an appeal for legitimacy - and the other is an appeal for the truth - who is right and who is wrong in the arguments, and in terms of human rights. Under the law, everybody is equal. […] So, if you appeal to the European Court of Justice and say "I am not treated equally as a member of the EU, NATO” et cetera, they won't be able to dismiss it. Especially if you have a fair period of time to make your case.

 

 

Alexis Tsipras arriving at the Greek presidential office for talks with the country's political leaders, July 6th. © Reuters

 

If you go through the legal route – and I'm not saying to do that - you must aim [to establish the creditor institutions’] political delegitimisation. Let the whole world know the eurozone is committing a crime against humanity. Prove it in ten years, I don't mind. But you make a case for the courts to say "until we examine the case, these measures must stop".

Today it's too late. It is a matter of political and ideological hegemony. Varoufakis alone, with his appeal and arguments, managed to turn public opinion in Europe, even in Germany. The Eurogroup people stood back. In the beginning of February, [Dutch finance minister and Eurogroup president Jeroen] Dijsselbloem told Varoufakis "You either sign the memorandum that the others have signed too, or your economy is going to collapse”. How? “We are going to collapse your banks". He had said that. In his last interview to ERT, the national [Greek public] TV [channel], two days ago, Varoufakis said: "I didn't denounce that then, because I was hoping that reason would prevail in the negotiations with all of the Eurogroup". So he went on with the numerous agreements. And credibility as well as money was lost. The Eurogroup is not a proper democratically-functioning body. They [the Greek government of Alexis Tsipras] discovered that, again, very late, when they [the Eurogroup] wanted to throw Varoufakis out after the referendum announcement. Which was basically a gesture to humiliate. Varoufakis says "Who decides that?" Dijsselbloem says "I decide". Shouldn't there be a vote, shouldn't there be unanimity? Yes but it's not necessarily recorded, there are no minutes taken. He was taping, others too. Why? Because there are no minutes taken. So there is nothing formal.

You can't say "I went to the Eurogroup and Italy said that, Cyprus said that” et cetera. So everybody can come out and say anything they like. No-one can say: "Are you sure you said that? Let’s look at the minutes". There are no minutes. Of course, nobody can come out with a tape recorder. Varoufakis said that of course he kept the minutes of his own, because he was to report to the prime minister, and the others do it too. And the others came shouting "Oh! Varoufakis admitted this, and that".

The other countries in such a set-up had to think [German finance minister Wolfgang] Schäuble is the king, he controls the others, he can raise his voice and say “no". Varoufakis has described incidents that show really how the Eurozone is completely undemocratic, an almost neo-fascist euro dictatorship. You cannot rely on what the others are saying. Varoufakis says that if he could negotiate with one at a time for an hour, the deal would be struck in a day. But you can't do that because each one has different priorities and different people telling him “no”.

You cannot argue too much with Schäuble. It would be dangerous, because you won't get finance, German banks will want their money back, and so on. So it’s a institution where you cannot make your voice heard, so what's the point in encountering [them]? There was no-one else but Varoufakis talking straight. Schäuble has said "How much money do you want [in order] to leave the euro?" He doesn't want Greece in the euro at all. He was the first to raise the issue of a Grexit back in 2011.

We went to a war thinking we had the same weapons as them. We have underestimated their power […] It's a power that enters the very fabric of society, the way people think. It controls and blackmails. We have very few levers. The European edifice is already Kafkaesque.

-------------------------

08 July 2015 |  By christian salmon in MEDIAPART

Where did the Greek bailout money go ?

Less than 10% of the money was used by the government for reforming its economy and safeguarding weaker members of society

 

Only a small fraction of the €240bn (£170bn) total bailout money Greece received in 2010 and 2012 found its way into the government’s coffers to soften the blow of the 2008 financial crash and fund reform programmes.

Most of the money went to the banks that lent Greece funds before the crash.

Unlike most of Europe, which ran up large budget deficits to protect pensioners and welfare recipients, Athens was then forced to dramatically reduce its deficit by squeezing pensions and cutting the minimum wage.

The troika of lenders first stepped in during the spring of 2010 after Athens could no longer afford to finance €310bn borrowed from a wide range of major European banks.

Two years later, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European commission and European Central Bank (ECB) came up with a second bailout that centred on a €100bn debt write-off by private sector lenders.

Private bondholders saw the value of their bonds drop by 53% and took a further loss by exchanging the debt for securities with a lower interest rate.

This eliminated about €100bn of debt, but €34bn was used to pay for various “sweeteners” to get the the deal accepted. That €34bn was added to the Greek debt. Greek pension funds, which were major private lenders, also suffered terrible losses.

Then €48.2bn was used to bail out Greek banks which had been forced to take losses, weakening their ability to protect themselves and depositors.

Lastly, €140bn has been spent on paying the original debts and interest.

Less than 10% of the bailout money was left to be used by the government for reforming its economy and safeguarding weaker members of society.

Greek government debt is still about €320bn, 78% of it owed to the troika. As the Jubilee Debt Campaign says: “The bailouts have been for the European financial sector, while passing the debt from being owed to the private sector to the public sector.”

 

The Guardian

Implosão do grupo Espírito Santo – a queda de um símbolo da política de direita

Anatomia e dissecação de um colossal falhanço

 

Fez no dia 6 de abril quatro anos que Portugal pediu ajuda internacional. É mais do que tempo de fazer o balanço dos erros, mentiras e traições deste período e desconstruir o discurso que os vencedores têm produzido sobre o que se passou.

 

1 A 4 de abril, Angela Merkel elogia os esforços do Governo português para combater a crise, através de um novo plano de austeridade, o PEC 4. Com o apoio da chanceler alemã e do presidente da Comissão Europeia havia a real possibilidade de Portugal conseguir um resgate mais suave, idêntico ao que Espanha depois veio a ter. O primeiro-ministro, José Sócrates, dá conta ao líder da oposição, Pedro Passos Coelho, do que se passa. Este, pressionado pelo seu mentor e principal apoio partidário, Miguel Relvas, recusa-se a deixar passar o PEC 4, dizendo que não sabia de nada e que não apoiava novos sacrifícios. O seu objetivo é a queda do Governo e eleições antecipadas (ver o livro “Resgatados”, dos insuspeitos jornalistas David Dinis e Hugo Filipe Coelho). O Presidente da República, Cavaco Silva, faz um violento ataque ao Governo no seu discurso de posse, a 4 de abril, afirmando não haver espaço para mais austeridade. Os banqueiros em concertação pressionavam o ministro das Finanças. Teixeira dos Santos cede e coloca o primeiro-ministro perante o facto consumado, ao anunciar ao “Jornal de Negócios” que Portugal precisa de recorrer aos mecanismos de ajuda disponíveis. Sócrates é forçado a pedir a intervenção da troika. Merkel recebe a notícia com estupefação e irritação.

 

2 O memorando de entendimento (MoU) é saudado por políticos alinhados com a futura maioria, por economistas de águas doces, por banqueiros cúpidos e por comentadores fundamentalistas e bastas vezes ignorantes, pois, segundo eles, por cá nunca ninguém conseguiria elaborar tal maravilha. Hoje, pegando nas projeções para a economia portuguesa contidas no MoU, é espantoso constatar a disparidade com o que aconteceu. Em vez de um ano de austeridade tivemos três. Em vez de uma recessão não superior a 4%, tivemos quase 8%. Em vez de um ajustamento em 2/3 pelo lado da despesa e 1/3 pelo lado da receita, tivemos exatamente o contrário: uma austeridade de 23 mil milhões reduziu o défice orçamental em apenas 9 mil milhões. Em vez de um desemprego na casa dos 13%, ultrapassámos os 17%. Em vez de uma emigração que não estava prevista, vimos sair do país mais de 300 mil pessoas. E em vez da recuperação ser forte e assente nas exportações e no investimento, ela está a ser lenta e anémica, assentando nas exportações e no consumo interno. A única coisa que não falhou foi o regresso da República aos mercados. Mas tal seria possível sem as palavras do governador do BCE, Mario Draghi, no verão de 2013, ou sem o programa de compra de dívida pública dos países da zona euro? Alguém acredita que teríamos as atuais taxas de juro se não fosse isso, quando as agências de rating mantêm em lixo a nossa dívida pública? Só mesmo quem crê em contos de crianças.
 

3 Durante o período de ajustamento, Carlos Costa, governador do Banco de Portugal, sublinhou sempre que o nosso sistema financeiro estava sólido. Afinal, não só não estava sólido como tinha mais buracos do que um queijo gruyère. BCP, BPI e Banif tiveram de recorrer à linha pública de capitalização incluída no memorando da troika, o BES implodiu, a CGD foi obrigada a fazer dois aumentos de capital subscritos pelo Estado, o Montepio está em sérias dificuldades — e só o Santander escapou.

 

4 O ex-ministro das Finanças, Vítor Gaspar, e o primeiro responsável da troika, Poul Thomsen, negaram durante dois anos que houvesse um problema de esmagamento de crédito às empresas. Pelos vistos desconheciam que a esmagadora maioria das PME sempre teve falta de capital, funcionando com base no crédito bancário. Como os bancos foram obrigados a cortar drástica e rapidamente os seus rácios de crédito, milhares de empresas colapsaram, fazendo disparar o desemprego. Gaspar e a troika diriam depois terem sido surpreendidos com esta evolução. A sobranceria dos que se baseiam na infalibilidade do Excel, aliada à ignorância dos que pensam que a mesma receita funciona em qualquer lugar, tem estes resultados.

 

5 Passos Coelho disse e redisse que as privatizações tornariam a economia portuguesa muito mais competitiva, levando os preços praticados a descer. Pois bem, a EDP foi vendida a muito bom preço porque as autoridades garantiram aos chineses da Three Gorges que os consumidores portugueses continuariam a pagar uma elevada fatura energética. E assim tem sido. Os franceses da Vinci pagaram muito pela concessão da ANA porque lhes foi garantido que poderiam subir as taxas sempre que o movimento aeroportuário aumentasse. Já o fizeram por cinco vezes. O Governo acabou com a golden share na PT e não obstou à saída da CGD do capital da telefónica. Depois assistiu, impávido e sereno, ao desmoronamento da operadora. A CGD foi obrigada pelo Governo a vender por um mau preço a sua participação na Cimpor. Hoje, a cimenteira é uma sombra do que foi: deixou de ser um centro de decisão, de competência e de emprego da engenharia nacional. Os CTT foram privatizados e aumentaram exponencialmente os resultados, à custa da redução do número de balcões e da frequência na entrega do correio.

 

6 A famosa reforma do Estado resumiu-se na prática a aumentar impostos, cortar salários, pensões e apoios sociais, bem como a fragilizar as relações laborais, flexibilizando o despedimento individual, diminuindo o valor das indemnizações, reduzindo o valor do subsídio de desemprego e o seu tempo de duração. O modelo económico passou a assentar numa mão de obra qualificada mas mal paga, em empregos precários e não inovadores, em trabalhadores temerosos e nada motivados.

 

7 O programa de ajustamento fez Portugal recuar quase 15 anos. Perdemos centro de decisão e de competência e não apareceram outros. A classe média proletariza-se sob o peso dos impostos. Nos hospitais reaparecem doenças e epidemias há muito erradicadas. O investimento estrangeiro estruturante não veio, o perfil da economia e das exportações não se alterou, a aposta na investigação eclipsou-se. E tudo para se chegar a um ponto em que a troika nos continua a dizer que já fizemos muito mas que é preciso fazer mais — e os credores internacionais nos vão manter sob vigilância até 2035. Sob o manto diáfano da fantasia, a nudez forte da verdade mostra que este ajustamento não teve apenas algumas coisas que correram mal — foi um colossal falhanço. E, desgraçadamente, os próximos anos vão confirmá-lo.

 

Nicolau Santos, in “Expresso”

Os que ontem te puseram no buraco,são os que hoje comentam o buraco em que te puseram !

Quem fala assim não é gago !

Primeiro-ministro teve cinco processos no fisco (Expresso) -   4 de março de 2015
 
Dívida de Passos em 2004 era de 5016 euros e não de 2880 (Público) -   3 de março de 2015

Passos Coelho não pagou contribuições à Segurança Social durante cinco anos (Expresso) - 28 de fevereiro de 2015

Passos Coelho investigado por ilegalidade (DN) - 18 de setembro de 2014

A vida "esquecida" de Passos Coelho (Visão) -   3 de novembro de 2014

União Europeia investiga Passos Coelho, Miguel Relvas e Tecnoforma (Público) - 29 de maio de 2013

Passos Coelho criou ONG financiada apenas pela Tecnoforma (Público) - 3 de dezembro de 2012

"Soñamos...pero nos tomamos muy en serio nuestros sueños !"

Discurso de Pablo Iglésias na Puerta del Sol, Madrid, 31/01/2015

Enterro da Europa Connosco

25 de Maio

Participe na Cerimónia !

 

No próximo domingo, a política de confisco vai a votos. Uma política que não merece prova de vida continuada. Jaz morta & arrefecida segundo as leis da razão geral, embora se mantenha ligada à máquina da usura & da vilania. Assim sendo, para os defensores dos interesses electivos-colectivos, a pauta da austeridade soa a música fúnebre. De facto, esta UE é mais um cadáver adiado que procria. [1] Sendo o que é, o corpo presente será velado em milhares de urnas. Os que insistam em celebrar o Roubo do Século & a Ocupação do Exército da Finança têm uma bela ocasião para expressar os seus sentimentos à Famiglia do Arco, a quem os portugueses agradecem, entre outras benesses & bençãos, os Fundos Perdidos, o BPN, o BPP, as PPP, os Swap, os Submarinos, a Corrupção em Grande Escala, o Assalto Fiscal aos Indefesos, o Desemprego Massivo, a Emigração em Massa, a Miséria Máxima Garantida, o Desmantelamento do Serviço Nacional de Saúde, da Segurança Social, da Escola Pública. Os programadores de ilusões & emoções apreciam eleitores de lágrima fácil, dados a amores de perdição. Domingo, demasiados farão fila para manifestar a sua fidelidade à troika de residência fixa & confessar a sua eterna saudade à troika da falsa partida.

Por outro lado, nós, tendencialmente mais dos que os do costume, denunciaremos as propostas indecentes da Frau Merkel & do Mister Obama, ela, Mordoma dos Donos da Europa, ele, Porteiro dos Senhores do Mundo. Os mandatários & os paus-mandados do Capitalismo Global afivelarão a máscara da vontade popular, uns com ar de velório (temem funestos desfechos), outros com expectativa nas maçãs do rosto (apostam na inércia rotativista). Olhai-os de frente. São eles. Em pose cívica-cínica. Porventura, amáveis. Se mediaticamente correcto, pesarosos. Milhões de empobrecidos & devorados pelos gangsters em três anos de ajuste-saque? É de lastimar. Ninguém ficaria indiferente. Os crocodilos comovem-se. Se for conveniente dar corda ao coração, imitam as vítimas. Partilham as dores da pátria & da mátria. Fingirão pertencer à comunidade. São predadores de boas famílias & de bons princípios. Alguns frequentaram universidades à bolonhesa. Alguns especializaram-se no mundo do crime. Ei-los. Habitualmente rodeados de câmaras, microfones, toma-notas, guarda-cabeças, guarda-costas. Ei-los. Os Trigémeos da Democracia Cristã na Gaveta, da Social-Democracia na Gaveta, do Socialismo na Gaveta. Da Democracia cada vez mais engavetada. Fixai-os de perfil. São eles. Os da Democracia Cristã da Sopa dos Pobres, os da Social-Democracia dos Barões, os do Socialismo da FaceOculta. 

Entretanto, nós, os do dia limpo, [2] pronunciar-nos-emos contra o embuste da Europa connosco, daremos a cara pela Civilização Humana, pelos Valores Constitucionais, pela Inalienável Soberania, pela Indesarmável Resistência, pela Efectiva Ruptura, pela Mudança de Projecto/Trajecto. Não faltaremos, pois, à chamada de domingo, 30 dias após o 25 de Abril, a três dias do 28 de Maio.

Participaremos, consequentemente, com a nossa pazada, no euro-enterro.

(1). Fernando Pessoa, Mensagem, Parceria António Maria Pereira, 1934. 

(2) Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen, O Nome das Coisas, Moraes Editores, 1977. 

CÉSAR PRÍNCIPE

Este artigo encontra-se em http://resistir.info/.

Saída Limpa! Conseguimos! Saída Limpa!

A Voz Laboral

Via Partido Obrigado Troika

Lisboa 2014

7 de Março de 2014, Lisboa. Dispositivo policial nas escadarias da assembleia da república, durante a manifestação das forças de segurança. Fotografia de Miguel Manso (Público)

O Assalto

Espiral de náusea

A Goldman Sachs aparenta ser um banco, mas o seu currículo mais parece um cadastro, devido às suas ligações com uma interminável série de irregularidades, que vão das bolhas imobiliárias e financeiras, à manipulação de mercados, à corrupção de governos, incluindo a maquilhagem das contas públicas gregas, que inaugurou a atual crise europeia. AGoldman Sachs é um dos nichos de um poder mundial não eleito, não submetido a constrangimentos constitucionais, não obrigado a testes de legitimidade.

Um poder fáctico, sem lealdade de pátria, religião ou doutrina. Escassas centenas de homens que gerem em rede dinheiro e influência. Um dos instrumentos da sua estratégia consiste em cativar pessoas brilhantes do mundo académico, projetando-as depois em altos lugares políticos de países e/ou organizações internacionais. Paulson, Draghi, Monti, Issing, ou o falecido António Borges estão nessa lista. José Luís Arnaut (JLA), figura influente do PSD, foi nomeado para o Conselho Consultivo Internacional da Goldman Sachs.

 Ao contrário das figuras citadas, a JLA não se lhe conhece uma única ideia própria, mas sabe-se que o seu escritório de advocacia tem sido fundamental no "apoio" ao Governo em matéria de privatizações. A Goldman Sachs espreita, ávida, sempre que um país é obrigado a vender os seus anéis. José Luís Arnaut é, portanto, um hábil perito em transformar propriedade pública em salvados. Merecedor da gratidão pública da Goldman Sachs. Milhões de portugueses e europeus labutam, preocupados com o (des)emprego e o desamparo da crise. Lutam por uma democracia que não retire os seus filhos do mapa do futuro. Mas há quem faça carreira e lucro à custa do sofrimento geral. A espiral recessiva parece ter sido travada. Mas a espiral da náusea moral, essa, está ainda muito longe de ter batido no fundo.

Texto de Viriato Soromenho Marques (DN 14JAN2014)

26OUT

 

19OUT

O Zé Francisco partiu

Carta de “Chalana” sobre Francisco José Martinho dos Santos, um dos protagonistas da reportagem “SOS na zona pobre”, que morreu à espera de uma casa.

 

 

Francisco José Martinho dos Santos tinha 30 anos. Vivia em condições miseráveis com a mulher, de 21, e o filho, de quatro, na “ilha” de Campanhã que o PÚBLICO retratou na reportagem “SOS na zona pobre”. Francisco José, feito “homem fantasma” numa rixa que o deixou impossibilitado de trabalhar, esperava que a Câmara do Porto lhe atribuísse uma casa. Esteve perto de o conseguir, mas um engano deixou a família a viver entre as mesmas paredes podres.

 

Francisco José morreu à espera. José António Pinto, técnico assistente social da Junta de Freguesia de Campanhã, conhecido como “Chalana”, deu a notícia ao autor da reportagem, o jornalista Paulo Moura, nesta quinta-feira, através de uma carta que publicamos na íntegra:

 

"Olá Paulo Moura,

 

O Zé Fran­cisco par­tiu. Fale­ceu ontem no Hospital de S. João. Quando a grande reportagem do jor­nal PÚBLICO foi edi­tada, já se encon­trava inter­nado.
 

Mesmo sendo sev­era­mente pobre e cas­ti­gado por estas políti­cas soci­ais, o Zé son­hava ver o Ivo crescer, a Sara sor­rir com dentes novos e pas­sar já o próximo Natal numa casa digna e decente cedida pela Câmara Munic­i­pal do Porto.

 

Soube hoje desta triste notí­cia pela boca do seu filho, que me procurou com a avó no posto de atendi­mento do Bairro do Lagarteiro para me dizer “Ó dr. Pinto, o meu pai já saiu do hos­pi­tal, mas agora não podes falar mais com ele. Foi para o Céu. Quando eu for grande e se me por­tar bem, ele volta.”

 

Peguei neste menino de óculos novos e fomos passear de carro. Ouvir música, lan­char, desen­har, jogar com­puta­dor. Devolvi-o à mãe de olhos enchar­ca­dos às 19h30. Já era noite, tudo estava escuro e triste naquele portão da ilha.

 

O Zé era muito novo. Mere­cia ter vida e vida em abundân­cia. O sis­tema esmagou-o, não lhe deu opor­tu­nidades nem recursos, não per­mi­tiu que ele real­izasse os seus son­hos, não lhe pro­por­cio­nou as mín­i­mas condições dig­nas de sobre­vivência, não foi justo com as suas reivin­di­cações.

 

O Zé chorou no hos­pi­tal quando perce­beu que estava a chegar ao fim, sem­anas antes tinha-se revoltado no Gabi­nete do Inquilino Munic­i­pal quando a téc­nica gestora do seu pedido de casa o infor­mou que a chave do novo tecto ainda estava demor­ada. Nesse dia chorou de raiva.

 

A sua dig­nidade e os seus dire­itos foram ao longo destes anos sendo enter­ra­dos, hoje o seu corpo tam­bém foi para debaixo da terra.

Aquele abraço fraterno,

José António Pinto (Chalana)"

 

Fonte: Público