Atenas, Julho de 2015

Protesters march in front of the Greek parliament holding banners and flags. Around 50 anti-austerity demonstrators were arrested by police.

 

A youth in an oxygen mask hurls a petrol bomb as violence breaks out in the Greek capital on the eve of the parliament debate on the bailout.

Dozens of hooded anti-austerity demonstrators and riot police clashed on the streets of Athens last night, with petrol bombs being thrown.

Protest: Greeks took to the streets of Athens on Monday furious at the way Tsipras handled negotiations - rejecting lighter reforms during months of talks before caving in to harsh austerity measures at the 11th hour.

Hostility: Greeks have accused Germany of using WW2-style tactics to condemn their country to austerity. Pictured is a poster outside an Athens bank depicting German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble as a Nazi.

A woman burns a Syriza flag during a demonstration against the Greek bailout deal in Athens on Tuesday. Many people in the country have been angered by the agreement.

 

Fonte: Daily Mail

O IV REICH

Todos e qualquer um dos envolvidos na chamada “maratona negocial” de Bruxelas – se é que aquilo teve alguma coisa de negocial – podem reclamar o seu pedacinho de “acordo”, até a paternidade do êxito, como faz o primeiro ministro de Portugal em exercício, mas o mais fácil de tudo é identificar as vítimas: os gregos e, com eles, todos os povos da Europa.

Em bicos de pés, à deriva como sempre, Hollande ufana-se de ter driblado a estratégia alemã de expulsar a Grécia do Euro; Tsipras, que vai ter de explicar a quase dois terços dos gregos que disseram não à troika e à austeridade porque é que eles vão continuar a receber visitas da troika para os esmagar com a austeridade, argumenta que foram derrotados os intentos das forças mais conservadoras da Europa; Tusk, Juncker, Djesselbloem e companhia dirão o que muito bem lhes apetecer por tudo lhes ser permitido.

A senhora Merkel, porém, limita-se a dizer que a Grécia “ainda tem um longo caminho a percorrer” para que o acordo se transforme em nova ajuda envenenada que garantirá mais recessão em cima dos 25% já acumulados – o diagnóstico é feito pelo insuspeito canal Bloomberg.

O senhor Schauble, esse conserva o sábio silêncio dos vencedores. Os mercados respiram aliviados, as bolsas navegam em euforia, os credores afinam as contas à luz das novas operações especulativas que aí vêm. O senhor Schauble pode gozar o triunfo em silêncio, os factos falam por ele, o IV Reich venceu um duro teste e, por isso, sai dele mais reforçado.

A Alemanha pretendia a saída da Grécia da Zona Euro e não o conseguiu? É meia verdade. A saída seria a situação limite no caso de o governo grego manter as exigências que começou por apresentar; Berlim, porém, não desejava a saída pela saída. Esta funcionaria como um castigo exemplar para um caso de persistente rebeldia, mas tornar-se-ia desnecessária se essa atitude se desvanecesse através dos processos de chantagem a que as instituições e dirigentes europeus chamam “negociação”.

Como o governo grego cedeu, e permite até que o processo de privatização do país seja, um quarto de século depois, uma réplica da liquidação da RDA, pode evitar-se a saída do país do Euro e as concomitantes perturbações nos mercados. O exemplo para os eventuais recalcitrantes ficou dado, a par da demonstração de que não há alternativa à austeridade e à liquidação sistemática dos direitos sociais, laborais e humanos. Perfeito.

Reina agora a paz no IV Reich. A experiência de um governo fora do arco da governação, como a que foi tentada na Grécia, está em frangalhos meio ano depois; a troika continua viva e de boa saúde para que os credores recebam tudo a que têm e não têm direito; as dívidas soberanas, impossíveis de pagar, poderão ultrapassar em breve os 200% dos PIB – o que não será difícil com a acelerada degradação destes – pelo que os especuladores exultam. A senhora Merkel necessitou de apenas meia dúzia de horas para reencontrar a moeda de “confiança” que alegou ter perdido antes da reunião fatal para os gregos. E para que o fundo de garantia da “ajuda” à Grécia construído a partir das privatizações do que ainda resta no país não descarrile, por detrás da ideia e da execução estão instituições financeiras alemãs tituladas por gente idónea como o senhor Schauble e o senhor Sigmar Gabriel, o chefe dos sociais- democratas, aliás os inventores da engenhosa estratégia de privatização da RDA.

Alguns ingénuos poderão interrogar-se: mas por onde andam a democracia, a vontade dos povos, no meio disto tudo? A resposta é simples: o IV Reich, como os anteriores, não se orienta pelos ideais democráticos mas sim pelo respeito dos genuínos interesses alemães, na Alemanha e em toda a parte.

Assim nasceram duas guerras mundiais, sem que tenha desaparecido a arrogância germânica, enquanto vai crescendo a sede de vingança. Realidade que se percebe na ânsia não apenas de derrotar os mais fracos, mas também de os humilhar.

 

Texto de José Goulão, via Mundo Cão

'We underestimated their power': Greek government insider lifts the lid on five months of 'humiliation' and 'blackmail'

In this interview with Mediapart, a senior advisor to the Greek government, who has been at the heart of the past five months of negotiations between Athens and its international creditors, reveals the details of what resembles a game of liar’s dice over the fate of a nation that has been brought to its economic and social knees. His account gives a rare and disturbing insight into the process which has led up to this week’s make-or-break deadline for reaching a bailout deal between Greece and international lenders, without which the country faces crashing out of the euro and complete bankruptcy. He describes the extraordinary bullying of Greece’s radical-left government by the creditors, including Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem’s direct threat to cause the collapse of the Hellenic banks if it failed to sign-up to a drastic austerity programme. “We went into a war thinking we had the same weapons as them”, he says. “We underestimated their power”.

 

A senior member of Greece’s negotiating team with its European creditors agreed to a meeting last week in Athens with Mediapart special correspondent Christian Salmon. Speaking on condition that his name is withheld, he detailed the history of the protracted and bitter negotiations between the radical-left Syriza government, elected in January, and international lenders for the provision of a new bailout for the debt-ridden country.

The almost two-hour interview in English took place just days before last Sunday’s referendum on the latest drastic austerity-driven bailout terms offered by the creditors, and opposed by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, and which were finally rejected by 61.3% of Greek voters.

 

While the ministerial advisor slams the stance of the international creditors, who he accuses of leading a strategy of deliberate suffocation of Greece’s finances and economy, he is also critical of some of the decisions taken by Athens. His account also throws light on the personal tensions surrounding the talks led by former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, who resigned from his post on Monday deploring “a certain preference by some Eurogroup participants, and assorted ‘partners’, for my ‘absence’ from its meetings”.

The advisor cites threats proffered to Varoufakis by Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem, warning he would sink Greece's banks unless the Tsipras government bowed to the harsh deal on offer, and by German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who he says demanded: "How much money do you want to leave the euro?"

 

The interview follows below and over the following three pages presented in a continuous series of extracts (editor’s notes appear in italics within hard brackets):

-------------------------

 

From early on I disagreed that it was only a negotiation - we give this, you give that, you come closer. Because what happened was they had some negotiations, some details about fiscal policy, about conditions, et cetera. So, through these discussions it was the government that was coming, coming - coming close to the Troika, without them making any move towards us, and never discussing the debt: debt restructuring, debt sustainability, and also, you know, financing. We are going to get some new financing, is the ECB [editor's note: European Central Bank] going to lift all these caps, all these restrictions, these limits on how much the banks can borrow, the state can borrow from the banks? Because we can't borrow.

We used to. Up until February, we could still issue treasury bills. Short-term, three-month fixed bonds, mostly one-year. But this government was never allowed to do that because it was finished. No more treasury bills […] You see, the problem with treasury bills, [is that] it is the Greek banks who buy it. And the ECB said: “No more treasury bills”. So the state could not borrow from the banks.

So, from March, April onwards, we started economizing from the state, pulling together all the cash reserves from different branches, agencies, local authorities, things like that, in order to manage to pay the IMF [International Monetary Fund]. We paid once, we paid twice, and [we had] to pay wages as well. We paid wages from earnings, from tax receipts. But it's not enough to pay the IMF. We have a problem with the primary surplus, we couldn't pay the IMF, so we had to scrape around.

 

So basically this has created a domestic shortage of liquidity, liquidity in cash. Banks, export companies, good companies, could not borrow, people could not pay back their debts, they couldn't get any extensions to their credits and basically the credit system started to disintegrate, to not function. Of course, the banks themselves had some security reserves, but when they reached the point they said the banks can't even borrow even from the ELA [Emergency Liquidity Assistance fund] at all, they had to shut down, because they would deplete their reserves.

[...] Companies who do not pay their employees through bank accounts cannot pay cash to the employees - and there are many. Also they say "look, we don't have any revenues so I give you 500 euros instead of 800 euros and we'll see what happens after the banks reopen". So we have a situation which is escalating into a chain reaction […] like having a heart attack. A heart attack if you view cash liquidity as the blood of the economy. On the weekend when the ECB stopped, we had the heart attack. Now we are having its after effects. Different organs are getting numb. Some stop working, others are trying but they don't have enough blood.

 

On former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis:

 

Unable to see eye-to-eye: Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem (left) and Yanis Varoufakis meeting in Athens in February. © Reuters.

 

People are asking why he is supposed to be so unpopular with the Eurogroup and the people in power, why they don't like him. And a lot of people say they don't like him because he appears to be lecturing them, because of being arrogant. He thinks this is an academic issue, an economic issue or a technical issue. But what I think is that all these people - especially people in politics, in power, the Eurogroup, fellow ministers - they have seen a phenomenon that is much more different than anything they have encountered in their circle, from those elected, in the normal process of politics.

Because you have a man that has his own style of dressing, he is very self-confident, at the same time he is very friendly, very open, very honest. You know, you ask him a question and he doesn't spin around, he doesn't change the subject, and so this creates difficulty, both to the politician and the journalist, [to] the media. These are two things that show that Varoufakis doesn't fit, but on the other hand he is a celebrity and he creates clashing emotions. You hate him or you love him.

 

On the grave immediate crisis facing the Greek banks:

The reserves were not to the amount. We are in a situation where normally the liquidity in the market, the money that circulates in the market, is around 10 billion euros, but now with all that is happening, [with] people keeping money under the mattress, it is around 50 billion. 50 billion euros of cash circulate, and the ECB has stopped [its emergency funding of Greek banks]. So this means that people who have bank accounts, say [with] 2-3-4-5 thousand [euros], they can only get 60 euros per day, and if you have more accounts, OK, you can get more per day. But what about the people who have no account, who expect to live off their salary? At the end of every month they are broke until the paycheck comes […] From yesterday they were only giving 50 euros. Only smaller banks, like post office banks, which have fewer customers, can still give 60 euros. But the big four [banks] - National, Piraeus, Alpha and Eurobank - have run out of [notes of] 20s, so they can only give 50. So from 60 euros it has fallen to 50.

 

A  security guard delivers cash to a bank in Athens, June 28th. © Reuters.

 

But the security reserves which they have kept, they run out of it. If all the people go and get 60 euros - even if they don't need it, but just to save something - there will come a time they [the banks] will have no cash [left]. And that's where the problem starts. And in that case, if we don't have an emergency liquidity supply from the ECB, we have no option but to start issuing some kind of [parallel] money. Of course, that would be the end of the economy because already there is fear, there is panic, that even if the banks open again, they will still need to be re-capitalised. Up to now, they have been solvent.

They were borrowing from the ELA, they should have been able to borrow from the ECB as well, but the ECB said "No, from now on we don't accept your collateral. You have to borrow more expensively from the ELA". That's another of those caps limits the banks have. But if they run out of reserves, the state paid about 40 billion to replenish the capital which the banks lost after the [2012] haircut of the old Greek bonds.

The part of the second programme of the agreement of 2012, after the haircut of the PSI [Private Sector Involvement], which was about 170 billion euros, 50 billion out of that was for the recapitalisation of the banks. Of course, there was another problem. From the PSI, the public funds suffered losses almost, if not more, in their own reserves. Why? Because they were forced under the law to save their cash reserves with the Bank of Greece, and the Bank of Greece had the right to use these funds to buy bonds on their behalf.

For me it was a big scandal because apparently what happened was a lot of politicians, bankers, a lot of people went and gave - they had bonds that they had bought 20% - they went and they gave it to the Greek Central Bank, Bank of Greece, 100%, they got their money and then the haircut comes to the public.

 

Basically, what they were forced to do was to use their cash reserves, social security funds, pension funds, in order to buy government bonds that were going to be cut in real terms around 70% in present value. So the funds right now, the pension funds, are facing a bigger problem than the banks are facing. The pension funds have to plan 15 to 20 years ahead to be able to pay pensions, when the aging population is increasing and the working population is decreasing. They also have to pay unemployment benefits and so on. So, all these debt locks came to the front now.

[…] Already from the end of February and certainly by the middle of March it was obvious that the creditors were not going to honour the February 20th agreement, which says that Greece proposes reforms, the Troika - "the Institutions", as it is now called - evaluates and agrees and the reforms go on. Nothing like that happened. The institutions were continuously rejecting reforms without looking. "No, they are too generous" and Varoufakis was telling them: "Please, let us complete four to five reforms on which we all agree and view as necessary and let us implement them and you can evaluate and make an assessment of them".

[The Institutions said] "No, no, we need a comprehensive agreement before we implement these reforms, because if you implement these reforms that would be a unilateral action. We haven't approved them yet, ok, we agree, but we still haven't determined the primary surplus". So we are unable to do anything while at the same time they wanted to see our books because they didn't trust our numbers. "We want to go to the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Greece" et cetera, and Varoufakis was saying: "No, let’s start from the agreement of February 20th under which you are not supervising the Greek economy anymore and you are not assisting us or the creditors to assess the viability of the economy so as to gradually return to growth. That's the objective of the February 20th agreement, an extension of the existing programme. We amend, evaluate and complete the programme in four months. June 30th, programme finished".  

But they pulled the plug on the banks and on Tuesday June 30th the programme finished, so we are not in a programme.

All the money they owe us… about 17 billion euros, [of which] 10 billion [is] from the remainder of the 50-billion-euro [Hellenic] Financial Stability Fund which, under the February 20th agreement, we would have to give back. We have not received any money from June last year, so for 12 months we have been paying around 10 billion euros to the creditors from our resources without getting a single euro from them, which they had agreed to give, of course under conditions. It was obvious they were not going to cooperate and that we needed growth and these were two problems going side by side. They didn't want to finance the money we were entitled to in order to pay the debts.

On the 'maze of pseudo-negotiations', and the 'character assassination' of Varoufakis:

All the loans we have received, 240 to 250 billion euros, go for the servicing of the debt, back to the creditors. The first bailout was a bailout of the banks to the state. We didn't get any finance in order to pay them, we couldn't borrow short-term and we couldn't facilitate the liquidity of the economy because the ECB was putting one restriction after the other. So you have the liquidity problem and at the same time you have a financing problem. The two of them are connected in what I called from the beginning ‘credit asphyxiation’.

In the middle of March, finally, some Brussels sources said to the correspondents in Brussels that "yes, the institutions – the EBD, IMF, European Commission, are using credit asphyxiation in order to force the government to comply, accept the reforms, do it quickly, et cetera.". For me it was an admission that they were using the worst king of economic blackmail to the country. The worst kind of economic sanctions. If we [take] Iraq, and instead of doing a trade embargo they said "we cut all your assets, your banks have no money, no dollars, no anything, you have to rely on printing money, you're going to have an exposure". But they didn't do that in Iraq. It was a trade embargo, not a financial or credit asphyxiation. Because at any moment, gradually, there comes a time you die. You can't survive this much longer. Varoufakis has even called it "waterboarding", financial and fiscal waterboarding.

The assumption is that by pulling the plug, they pull the plug of the whole world. This has not happened and I am sorry. I was following how the euro was going, how it was reacting, because they did experiments. [German finance minister Wolfgang] Schäuble and Berlin are clever, they enforce artificial crises into the negotiations now and then: "Oh, the Greeks are not cooperating, they haven't understood what to do, they are not giving any figures". And instead of falling, the euro is going up. The same with European stock exchanges.

[…] Only in the last week they [the Greek government] realised it, and Varoufakis made a couple of statements, that we go to the European Court of Justice. When you reach the explosion of the crisis, legal arguments are not valid anymore, they can't help.

I said let Tsipras go to the European Parliament and say that this is how we were treated the last months. Also, refuse to implement these harsh measures. They [the Greek government] prefer to lose the elections [rather than] to enforce those measures. But every time they try political negotiation they [have been] fooled by them [the creditors]: twenty times with Merkel and five more with Schäuble. And how many Eurogroup [meetings] where they said "go back to the technical teams, go back to the Troika". The [Greek government] said "no, we want a political decision" [but they were told] "Our political decision is to go back to the technical decision, you can't have a political decision without a technical decision".

 

 

A Syriza party poster during the July 5th referendum campaign urging a "No" vote "for democracy and dignity". © Amélie Poinssot

 

[…] At every point they were trying to undermine the prestige that the Greek [Syriza] government had won during the first months of negotiation. At the time people said "a new hope for Europe... a new hope for Germany, Spain... the Greeks are giving us the lead”. If [the Institutions] said from the beginning "It’s finished, we don't agree, no more negotiations" - which they said indirectly, for example [Dutch finance minister and Eurogroup president Jeroen] Dijsselbloem - then it'd be clear and we would be in a clash: "We are elected, have prestige and authority. You are wrong etc". But they didn't do that […] They created a maze of pseudo-negotiations, time wasted, and it was on their side. All the time they were carrying negative propaganda against Varoufakis. Character assassination, and Varoufakis keeps saying that. But what did he expect?

So here we are, having lost all the economic ground of negotiating in real terms, of finding a new agreement, and also lost the credibility to force them to negotiate with us. The government, Tsipras, says that when they presented us the ultimatum "take it or leave it" [it was] with worst measures than they had presented to the previous government, the right-wing government […] the ECB tells the parliament "You take the measures or on Monday you have no banks". But our banks were alright. So instead what [the Greek government] did, and it was correct as a move, they went for the referendum, which means that they would have to do what they did in Cyprus for a week. They believed the situation would bring them closer to a deal. They didn't want a crisis.

But they don't have enough of a global or a European crisis, or a collapse. Yes the stock exchanges fall, yes there are fluctuations, the pound is rising. But, in the end, the Europeans are not forced to come closer.

[…] Varoufakis and Tsipras say that in case of a "No" [vote in the July 5th referendum], our bargaining position is strengthened. That's why they say "No", and not to an agreement that is not on the table anymore. "No" to any kind of agreement that doesn't deal with the debt restructuring or fiscal adjustment. The amount that is left for [the European institutions) to pay, 17 billion euros - plus another 16 or 20 billion from the IMF - are lost. The programme is finished and you need a new agreement. Basically what you do is beg the Europeans for an emergency funding through the ECB. But they say that to do that they have to go back to parliaments et cetera. But you need recapitalization in order to re-enter a process of economic functioning that would allow for dealing with a new programme.

 

Behind the scenes with 'king' Schäuble, and when Dijsselbloem threatened to sink the Greek banks:

Of course, even to discuss Grexit is illegal since there is no legal provision in the Treaties to do that. […] There is no safeguard that a Grexit can happen in an orderly, negotiated, peaceful manner instead of disorderly, with people running to the foodstores. If you don't have a process of exit from the euro, then exit is a weapon of mass destruction. If you threaten someone with Grexit, you push him to the limit of the banking system's ability to withstand pressure. Then you destroy the banking system quickly and then you start from scratch to create new currency, which takes months to form.

Instead of saying that Grexit is illegal, they [the creditors] say that it's as destructive and disastrous for us as it is for you. That was wrong. First, I don't agree with this position because it's blackmail - "Be careful, I'm going to blow my brains out" - and it allows others to accuse us of blackmail. It's ridiculous for the others to accuse a country destroyed over five years of blackmail. But anyway, it's the wrong argument. The correct argument is that a Grexit and all the other measures that the Greeks have suffered are illegal under international law, under labour law, under the European treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights, European declaration of labour rights [contained in the European Social Charter].

 

The funny thing is that in early 2014, the European Parliament and all of them started attacking the Troika, with statements that it is illegal, unaccountable, is following measures that are destroying human rights, labour rights. Of course, we had a [conservative] government that didn't want to hear about this, because it wanted to attack the opposition and not the creditors. It failed to see that this was the greatest weapon we had.

For the weak side, there are only two methods. One is the law – an appeal for legitimacy - and the other is an appeal for the truth - who is right and who is wrong in the arguments, and in terms of human rights. Under the law, everybody is equal. […] So, if you appeal to the European Court of Justice and say "I am not treated equally as a member of the EU, NATO” et cetera, they won't be able to dismiss it. Especially if you have a fair period of time to make your case.

 

 

Alexis Tsipras arriving at the Greek presidential office for talks with the country's political leaders, July 6th. © Reuters

 

If you go through the legal route – and I'm not saying to do that - you must aim [to establish the creditor institutions’] political delegitimisation. Let the whole world know the eurozone is committing a crime against humanity. Prove it in ten years, I don't mind. But you make a case for the courts to say "until we examine the case, these measures must stop".

Today it's too late. It is a matter of political and ideological hegemony. Varoufakis alone, with his appeal and arguments, managed to turn public opinion in Europe, even in Germany. The Eurogroup people stood back. In the beginning of February, [Dutch finance minister and Eurogroup president Jeroen] Dijsselbloem told Varoufakis "You either sign the memorandum that the others have signed too, or your economy is going to collapse”. How? “We are going to collapse your banks". He had said that. In his last interview to ERT, the national [Greek public] TV [channel], two days ago, Varoufakis said: "I didn't denounce that then, because I was hoping that reason would prevail in the negotiations with all of the Eurogroup". So he went on with the numerous agreements. And credibility as well as money was lost. The Eurogroup is not a proper democratically-functioning body. They [the Greek government of Alexis Tsipras] discovered that, again, very late, when they [the Eurogroup] wanted to throw Varoufakis out after the referendum announcement. Which was basically a gesture to humiliate. Varoufakis says "Who decides that?" Dijsselbloem says "I decide". Shouldn't there be a vote, shouldn't there be unanimity? Yes but it's not necessarily recorded, there are no minutes taken. He was taping, others too. Why? Because there are no minutes taken. So there is nothing formal.

You can't say "I went to the Eurogroup and Italy said that, Cyprus said that” et cetera. So everybody can come out and say anything they like. No-one can say: "Are you sure you said that? Let’s look at the minutes". There are no minutes. Of course, nobody can come out with a tape recorder. Varoufakis said that of course he kept the minutes of his own, because he was to report to the prime minister, and the others do it too. And the others came shouting "Oh! Varoufakis admitted this, and that".

The other countries in such a set-up had to think [German finance minister Wolfgang] Schäuble is the king, he controls the others, he can raise his voice and say “no". Varoufakis has described incidents that show really how the Eurozone is completely undemocratic, an almost neo-fascist euro dictatorship. You cannot rely on what the others are saying. Varoufakis says that if he could negotiate with one at a time for an hour, the deal would be struck in a day. But you can't do that because each one has different priorities and different people telling him “no”.

You cannot argue too much with Schäuble. It would be dangerous, because you won't get finance, German banks will want their money back, and so on. So it’s a institution where you cannot make your voice heard, so what's the point in encountering [them]? There was no-one else but Varoufakis talking straight. Schäuble has said "How much money do you want [in order] to leave the euro?" He doesn't want Greece in the euro at all. He was the first to raise the issue of a Grexit back in 2011.

We went to a war thinking we had the same weapons as them. We have underestimated their power […] It's a power that enters the very fabric of society, the way people think. It controls and blackmails. We have very few levers. The European edifice is already Kafkaesque.

-------------------------

08 July 2015 |  By christian salmon in MEDIAPART

Where did the Greek bailout money go ?

Less than 10% of the money was used by the government for reforming its economy and safeguarding weaker members of society

 

Only a small fraction of the €240bn (£170bn) total bailout money Greece received in 2010 and 2012 found its way into the government’s coffers to soften the blow of the 2008 financial crash and fund reform programmes.

Most of the money went to the banks that lent Greece funds before the crash.

Unlike most of Europe, which ran up large budget deficits to protect pensioners and welfare recipients, Athens was then forced to dramatically reduce its deficit by squeezing pensions and cutting the minimum wage.

The troika of lenders first stepped in during the spring of 2010 after Athens could no longer afford to finance €310bn borrowed from a wide range of major European banks.

Two years later, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European commission and European Central Bank (ECB) came up with a second bailout that centred on a €100bn debt write-off by private sector lenders.

Private bondholders saw the value of their bonds drop by 53% and took a further loss by exchanging the debt for securities with a lower interest rate.

This eliminated about €100bn of debt, but €34bn was used to pay for various “sweeteners” to get the the deal accepted. That €34bn was added to the Greek debt. Greek pension funds, which were major private lenders, also suffered terrible losses.

Then €48.2bn was used to bail out Greek banks which had been forced to take losses, weakening their ability to protect themselves and depositors.

Lastly, €140bn has been spent on paying the original debts and interest.

Less than 10% of the bailout money was left to be used by the government for reforming its economy and safeguarding weaker members of society.

Greek government debt is still about €320bn, 78% of it owed to the troika. As the Jubilee Debt Campaign says: “The bailouts have been for the European financial sector, while passing the debt from being owed to the private sector to the public sector.”

 

The Guardian

Quem fala assim não é gago !

Primeiro-ministro teve cinco processos no fisco (Expresso) -   4 de março de 2015
 
Dívida de Passos em 2004 era de 5016 euros e não de 2880 (Público) -   3 de março de 2015

Passos Coelho não pagou contribuições à Segurança Social durante cinco anos (Expresso) - 28 de fevereiro de 2015

Passos Coelho investigado por ilegalidade (DN) - 18 de setembro de 2014

A vida "esquecida" de Passos Coelho (Visão) -   3 de novembro de 2014

União Europeia investiga Passos Coelho, Miguel Relvas e Tecnoforma (Público) - 29 de maio de 2013

Passos Coelho criou ONG financiada apenas pela Tecnoforma (Público) - 3 de dezembro de 2012

"Soñamos...pero nos tomamos muy en serio nuestros sueños !"

Discurso de Pablo Iglésias na Puerta del Sol, Madrid, 31/01/2015

A Voz Laboral

Via Partido Obrigado Troika

"A fome de uns é a fome de todos"

«Passei o mês de Agosto a ir ao hospital todos os dias. E em cada um desses dias veio um enfermeiro ou auxiliar ter comigo à porta do refeitório para lembrar-me que eu não podia entrar ali. Eu ia de braço dado com o meu pai e só queria garantir que ele chegava inteiro à cadeira, e preparar-lhe a comida, como se faz com as crianças, tirar as espinhas do peixe, descascar-lhe a laranja. Com bons modos, mas sem deixar margem para protestos ou pedidos especiais, apareceu sempre alguém para mandar-me sair porque só os doentes podem entrar no refeitório, as visitas estão proibidas de fazê-lo. A proibição justifica-se por razões de organização interna, espaço, ruído, etc. A razão principal só se sabe ao fim de alguns dias a passear pelos corredores: enquanto puderam entrar no refeitório, era frequente as visitas comerem as refeições destinadas aos doentes. Sentavam-se ao lado dos pais, avós, irmãos, maridos ou mulheres e iam debicando do seu prato, ou ficando com a parte de leão.

À minha ingénua indignação inicial, seguiram-se muitas histórias de miséria que ajudam a explicar como se pode chegar aí. Só quem, como eu, nunca a passou, demora a entender que a fome pode roubar tudo a um ser humano. Rouba-lhe a solidariedade até com os do seu sangue, a dignidade, o respeito, tudo aquilo que o faz ser gente. E pelo retrato que vi nesse hospital público do Porto, há fome nos nossos hospitais. Doentes que pedem ao companheiro do lado o pão que lhe sobrou, a laranja que não lhe apeteceu comer, a sopa que deixou a meio. Há quem diga que prefere comer um pão simples, ao lanche, para esconder na fímbria do lençol o pacote da manteiga ou da compota para mandar para os catraios lá de casa. Há quem não anseie pelo dia da alta porque, pelo menos ali, come as refeições todas. Há quem vá de mansinho à copa perguntar se dos outros tabuleiros sobrou alguma coisa que lhe possam dispensar.

Fica-se com um nó na garganta com tudo o que se vê e vira-se a cara para o lado com vergonha. Vergonha por ser parte disto, por não ter gritado o suficiente, por não ter sido parte da mudança que se reclama há tanto.

 

Foto: Carla Olas

 

E depois estão os caixotes de lixo remexidos pela noite fora, as filas para as carrinhas de distribuição de alimentos, o passeio do albergue cheio de gente, gente que vagueia como sonâmbula, que discute por uma moeda de vinte cêntimos ou por um portal onde dormir. E estão – a nossa maior vergonha – as cantinas escolares que têm de abrir nas férias para garantir a única refeição diária de tantas crianças, as mesmas cantinas que sabemos que estarão encerradas à hora do jantar.

A fome reduz-nos à biologia, despoja-nos de qualquer ideal, impede-nos de dizer não ou de levantar um dedo acusatório, e será pela fome que, como num passado não tão remoto assim, procurarão dominar-nos.

Quando se fazem campanhas eleitorais distribuindo benesses sob a forma de electrodomésticos, medicamentos que a miserável reforma de um velho não pode comprar, ou mandando matar porcos para apaziguar a fome nos bairros sociais, o que aparece mascarado de acção solidária não é mais do que a manipulação despudorada da necessidade alheia, necessidade a que, aliás, estas pessoas foram sendo condenadas, por décadas de injustiça social, corrupção, gestão ruinosa, e todos os etcs. que conhecemos demasiado bem mas a que nem por isso somos capazes de pôr fim.

E se nos distrairmos ainda acabamos a apontar o dedo aos excluídos, a fazer contas ao rendimento mínimo do vizinho, a aplaudir o corte no salário, na pensão, no subsídio, como se a igualdade se fizesse rebaixando, como se a solução fosse difundir a miséria em vez de democratizar as condições para uma vida digna.

Confesso que sinto o imperativo moral de pagar uma refeição a quem ma pede, mas tenho dificuldades em lidar com essa pessoa. Porque quero que fique claro que a relação entre nós, se se pode chamar relação, apenas deve ser de respeito mútuo e, sendo certo que em qualquer momento futuro as nossas imposições podem inverter-se, temos, um para com o outro, a mesma obrigação. Mas sinto-me sempre desconfortável com a mendicidade do outro, com a sua posição de aparente debilidade, com a minha ilusória superioridade.  A fome de uns é a fome de todos e já é hora de a sentirmos assim, mesmo que não nos aperte o estômago, mesmo que não nos roube a nossa dignidade.»  

Reblogado do Aventar

Texto de Carla Romualdo

26OUT

 

19OUT

Caso de tortura

Os acontecimentos dos últimos dois anos demonstraram que o governo da República Portuguesa, tutelado pelo conluio de credores formado pela Comissão Europeia, o Banco Central Europeu e o FMI, vulgo troika, é capaz de tudo para obrigar o povo a pagar a ganância dos agiotas internacionais.

As últimas notícias confirmam que quando se escreve “capaz de tudo” não é, neste caso, uma frase feita, uma muleta de retórica. É mesmo tudo, incluindo torturar o povo.

Torturar o povo? Não será exagero do escriba? Não é. Encontram outra interpretação para a intenção manifestada de cortar nas pensões de sobrevivência dos viúvos com a finalidade de financiar bancos, bolsas e especuladores que se alimentam da dívida portuguesa, jogando com ela a juros cruéis?

A expressão “pensão de sobrevivência” é eloquente: sobrevivência, um montículo de migalhas para acudir à montanha de custos e encargos que todos os dias se ergue no horizonte dos mais desfavorecidos. Pensões de sobrevivência são os rendimentos das viúvas e viúvos de Portugal, a quantia, na maior parte dos casos em formato de esmola, de que dispõe o cidadão que ao perder o cônjuge perde igualmente grande parte do rendimento familiar. A pensão é o resíduo que o sobrevivente recebe do que o companheiro descontou durante a sua vida de trabalho.

O governo de Portugal, no rescaldo de uma visita dos esbirros da troika, parece então disposto a assaltar as pensões de sobrevivência dos portugueses na sua estratégia de procurar “aqui e ali”, como ameaçou o vice-primeiro ministro Paulo Portas, os milhares de milhões necessários para pagar uma dívida impossível de pagar e que não se deve, por certo, a desmandos cometidos pela maioria dos portugueses, mas sim pela elite que os assalta.

O que se poupa atacando as pensões de sobrevivência? Uns trocos inúteis (100 milhões de euros, só os juros do primeiro resgate são 38 mil milhões...) perante a imensidão de uma dívida que chega aos 130 por cento do PIB e que, por alturas do início da intervenção da troika, precisamente para pagar essa dívida, estava à beira dos 90 por cento do PIB. Nesse tempo, dizia o presidente da República, tal dívida era “insustentável”. Hoje, 40 pontos percentuais acima desse nível, tornou-se “sustentável”, segundo o presidente da República, que por sinal é o mesmo – Aníbal Cavaco Silva.

Uns trocos retirados a rendimentos reduzidos, em muitos casos insultuosamente miseráveis, que são inúteis contra a dívida mas que, para muitas e muitas vítimas, representam a fronteira entre a sobrevivência e a morte lenta, entre a saúde e a doença, entre um mínimo de dignidade e a humilhação. Trocos que, além disso, simbolizam a infâmia do comportamento que é confiscar os legados que os cidadãos mortos deixaram às famílias e ao país.

Diz o já citado presidente da República que os portugueses, esmagados pelo regime de austeridade, são “masoquistas” por insistirem em dizer que não é possível pagar a dívida. Ora o assalto às pensões das viúvas e viúvos de Portugal, que não resolve problema algum na situação actual do país, é por isso um caso de punição gratuita e vingativa, com o requinte de ser uma tortura de aplicação lenta. Pelo que as elites que hoje governam a República Portuguesa atingiram o patamar supremo da desumanização, o da crueldade sádica.

Texto de José Goulão

Portugal, 68 anos depois...

Portugal, 68 anos depois...

Greve Geral de 27 Junho

Barcelona 01.06.2013

Barcelona 01.06.2013

Fotografo desconhecido

 

Galeria

Até quando ?

Selvajaria governamental !

Entrevista com o Presidente do Equador Rafael Correa à TVE

A corda vai rebentar

Quantas horas são precisas para obter uma informação ou um documento no serviço da segurança social, na loja do cidadão no Porto? Seis horas, quando corre bem. Tenho utentes que entram no edifício às 8 horas da manhã e saem de lá com o papel na mão depois das 4 da tarde, sem almoço no estômago 

         

Com que recursos económicos vais sobreviver se o teu subsídio social de desemprego acabou em Outubro de 2012 e se, até ao momento, ainda aguardas que o rendimento social de inserção, no valor de 238 euros, chegue à tua caixa de correio?

 

Tentas falar com a assistente social da tua área de residência mas como ela gere mais de 380 processos, só pode falar contigo daqui a 3 meses. O teu frigorífico já está vazio, os teus filhos já não têm passe dos STCP para viajar até à escola, as cartas da EDP, das águas e do gás, ameaçam com o corte de fornecimento ao teu domicílio. Hoje o carteiro trouxe um aviso postal. É uma carta registada da Câmara Municipal do Porto. A tua ordem de despejo tem de ser contestada e tu não entendes, nem sabes, como o vais fazer.

 

Pedes apoio judiciário à segurança social, não te respondem, vais ao serviço informativo saber desta apreciação, dizem-te que o processo foi mal instruído.

 

A santa Casa da Misericórdia anuncia mais um serviço de apoio e de emergência social. Dão-te um saco de alimentos por mês. A cantina social da coletividade do teu bairro já tem lista de espera. A tua vergonha e humilhação perante os vizinhos, amigos e familiares aperta-te a garganta e não te deixa engolir nem mastigar nada.

 

O teu vizinho já foi pedir ajuda à paróquia. A paróquia não tem verba suficiente para pagar os óculos que o teu filho precisa de comprar para ler o que a professora escreve no quadro da escola. O senhor padre liga para a Junta de Freguesia, a Junta já gastou este mês toda a verba destinada à ação social. Sobram uns medicamentos com um nome estranho, o seu prazo de validade já terminou.
 

As filas à porta do centro de emprego aumentam, cresce o desespero e a descrença. Cresce o número de arrumadores de carros, os lugares de exibição da prostituição na cidade, cresce o número de homens, mulheres e crianças que recolhem tudo o que é sucata, cresce o número de prédios hipotecados, as lojas fechadas, os negócios falidos, cresce o número de assaltos perigosos.
 

Agora tens de provar aos serviços da segurança social que és pobre. Organiza todos os papéis que te pedem, respeita os prazos que te são exigidos, trata de tudo através do computador. Tu não tens computador, não sabes lidar com essas máquinas, então és um inadaptado. O sistema lamenta mas vais ficar de fora da mísera proteção por uns tempos.

 

Brevemente, a assistente social vai querer visitar a tua casa. Vai fazer recomendações e exigências, vai-te ameaçar, vai-te vigiar, vai-te prometer uma pequena esmola para atenuar a tua revolta estéril. Na semana seguinte, és confrontado com novos cortes. O dinheiro que o Estado tinha reservado para matar a fome aos teus filhos vai ser canalizado para a recapitalização dos Bancos. Agora as regras são mais apertadas, os apoios económicos do Estado vão durar menos tempo, menos pessoas vão ter acesso a eles, o seu valor mensal será cada vez mais reduzido.

 

O teu cunhado mostra-te uma carta que a técnica de emprego lhe deu. Fala de um programa chamado "contrato emprego inserção". Não te permite fazer descontos para a segurança social, não tens direito a qualquer tipo de proteção quando ficares doente ou desempregado, trazes para casa 400 euros, trabalhas mais de 9 horas por dia, apanhas o autocarro das 6 horas da manhã, mudas de linha três vezes até chegares ao emprego, na carruagem do metro antes da paragem do bairro do Viso ouves na rádio uma canção antiga de Sérgio Godinho que diz "que força é essa amigo, que te põe de bem com os outros e de mal contigo?" Quando regressas a casa estás exausto. O dinheiro que trazes ao fim do mês não chega para pagar as contas mais rudimentares. Estás mais velho e triste. Estás a trabalhar mas, infelizmente, cada dia que passa ficas mais pobre.

Texto de José António Pinto publicado na Visão Solidária

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